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SECTION 1103 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. GEMSTAR-TV GUIDE INTERNA­
TIONAL, INC., AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF 
"EXTRAORDINARY PAYMENTS" 
INTRODUCTION 
The twentieth century ended with a thriving economy,1 and for 
the first time in United States history, average citizens were invest­
ing in the stock market.2 Instead of putting money into savings ac­
counts, many were investing their money; they were saving for 
homes, their children's college education, or their own retirement.3 
Then the corporate scandals hit, one after another-Enron, 
World Com, Adelphia, and Tyco-and many in this new class of in­
vestors lost their savings.4 
The scandals started in 2001, with EnronS hiding its losses and 
deceiving investors.6 In 2001, Enron "had a $618 million net loss 
for the third quarter and would reduce shareholder equity by $1.2 
billion."7 This had the greatest effect on investors, particularly En­
ron employees, who had invested their savings in the company.8 
Disturbingly, the corporate executives did not suffer nearly as much 
from the stock's sudden downturn.9 This was because corporate of­
1. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light 
Reform (And it Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 923 (2003). 
2. J. Brent Wilkins, Comment, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Ripple Ef­
fects of Restoring Shareholder Confidence, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 339, 339 (2005). 
3. See id. (stating that the financial markets are now an important part of many 
Americans' financial planning). 
4. Id. at 339-40. 
5. Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime 
After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 357 (2003); Peter T. Muchlinski, Enron 
and Beyond: Multinational Corporate Groups and the Internationalization of Govern­
ance and Disclosure Regimes, 37 CONN. L. REV. 725, 727 (2005). 
6. Jennifer S. Recine, Note, Examination of the White Collar Crime Penalty En­
hancements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1535, 1538 (2002). 
7. Brickey, supra note 5, at 357; Muchlinski, supra note 5, at 726; David S. Ruder 
et aI., The Securities and Exchange Commission's Pre- and Post-Enron Responses to 
Corporate Financial Fraud: An Analysis and Evaluation, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1103, 
1105 (2005). 
8. Recine, supra note 6, at 1539; see John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities 
Reform: An Enron Prosecutor's Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 59 (2005) (stating 
that the investors in Enron had no idea that this collapse was coming). 
9. Kroger, supra note 8, at 59; Recine, supra note 6, at 1539-40. 
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ficers prohibited regular employees from selling shares after Enron 
had restated its earnings.l° Executives, however, were able to sell 
their own shares during this blackout period.ll The executives' de­
ception thus caused many honest, hardworking people to lose their 
investments.12 The corporate scandals that followed Enron added 
to the financial losses of many middle-income investors.!3 
These scandals resulted in a media storm, to which the govern­
ment reacted quickly, passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 
2002.14 SOX is the most significant piece of securities legislation 
since the 1930S15 and imposes new and stricter regulations on the 
business community.16 Many sections of SOX impose greater liabil­
ities on corporate officersP SOX also enables the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to enforce stricter penalties against 
corporate officers.ls One of these penalties permits the SEC to 
temporarily freeze, in escrow, payments made to Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs).19 
Section 1103 of SOX allows the SEC to obtain a court order to 
temporarily freeze any "extraordinary payments" to be paid to cor­
10. Recine, supra note 6, at 1539. 
11. Id. at 1539-40. 
12. See id. at 1539 ("Enron's Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Kenneth Lay en­
couraged employees to continue investing in Enron even as he was dumping his own 
shares."). 
13. Cunningham, supra note 1, at 923-25. 
14. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corpo­
rate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1528 (2005). 
15. Thomas O. Gorman & Heather J. Stewart, Is There a New Sheriff in 
Corporateville? The Obligations of Directors, Officers, Accountants, and Lawyers After 
Sarbanes-Oxley of2002, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 135,137 (2004); see also President George 
w. Bush, President's Ten-Point Plan, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/ 
corporateresponsibility/index2.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2007) ("[T]he Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 [is] the most far-reaching reform of American business practices since the 
time of Franklin D. Roosevelt."). 
16. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.c.) (creating many different provisions within 
securities law). 
17. See Gorman & Stewart, supra note 15, at 148 (stating the Act makes execu­
tives responsible for protecting the company). Some examples include the obligation to 
certify financial statements and to assume personal liability for incorrect statements. 
Id. at 152. 
18. See Joel M. Androphy & Thomas Graham, 2002: A Legal Perspective: Crimi­
nal Law: White Collar Crime Update, 66 TEX. B.J. 66, 66-67 (2003) (listing the different 
penalties enacted by SOX). One example of this is barring executives from serving on 
the board of directors. 15 U.S.c. § 78u(d)(2) (Supp. IV 2004); Androphy & Graham, 
supra. 
19. 15 U.S.c. § 78u-3(c)(3) (Supp. IV 2004); Androphy & Graham, supra note 18, 
at 67. 
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porate officers.2o Since the passage of SOX, the SEC has struggled 
to define the phrase "extraordinary payments."21 Recently, the 
Ninth Circuit's decision in Securities and Exchange Commission v. 
Gemstar-TV Guide International, Inc., interpreted the meaning of 
"extraordinary payments."22 The majority, dissenting, and concur­
ring opinions set out three different tests for interpreting the 
phrase.23 This Note agrees with the holding in Gemstar but argues 
that the test that the majority uses in interpreting "extraordinary 
payments" is not effective. The concurrence's test is more appro­
priate because it would better enforce the purposes of SOX, make 
the provision easy to administer, and help deter violations of securi­
ties law. 
This Note will analyze the Gemstar decision and discuss the 
tests set out therein. Part I will provide background on SOX, in­
cluding its passage, its purpose, and a description of section 1103. 
Part II will discuss the history of the Gemstar case and the Ninth 
Circuit's decision, as well as other cases interpreting "extraordinary 
expenses" used in both the majority and dissenting opinions of the 
Gemstar decision. Part III will analyze the three different tests for 
interpreting "extraordinary payments." Part III will also argue that 
providing a bright-line rule to evaluate "extraordinary payments" in 
the context of severance packages is the best approach. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Securities Law Prior to SOX 
The major role of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) is to act as an advocate for investors.24 It is a small federal 
20. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, tit. XI, § 1103,116 Stat. 745, 
S07 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 7Su-3(c)(3)). 
21. See Michelle Rice, Securities Enforcement: The Ninth Circuit Confines the 
SEC's Enforcement Powers Under Section J103 of Sarbanes-Ox[ey, INSIGHTS, June 
2004, at 2, 4 (stating that the SEC is unclear about what defines an "extraordinary 
payment"). 
22. See generally SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 416 (2005). 
23. Jd. 
24. SEC, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors and Main­
tains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
whatwedo.shtml (last visited Jan. 2, 2007) [hereinafter "The Investor's Advocate"]' The 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created the SEC. 15 V.S.c. § 7Sd(a) (2000). The SEC 
includes a five-member commission, four divisions, and eighteen offices. [d.; THOMAS 
LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.3, at 26-28 (4th ed. 2002) [here­
inafter HAZEN 4th ed.]; The Investor's Advocate, supra. The five-member commission 
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agency that oversees all aspects of the securities markets.25 The 
SEC gives effect to securities law through the enforcement of sev­
eral different federal statutes,26 including the Securities Act of 
1933,27 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,28 and the Sarbanes­
Oxley Act of 2002.29 
B. Enactment and Purpose of sox 
1. Road to SOX 
The thriving economy of the 1990s caused a rise in the stock 
market and drew in many new investors.3o Around the turn of the 
century, however, corporate scandals started to surface, one after 
is appointed by the President. 15 U.S.c. § 78d(a); HAZEN 4th ed., supra, at 26-27; The 
Investor's Advocate, supra. 
25. HAZEN 4th ed., supra note 24, at 22; Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, SEC, Speech 
by SEC Chairman: Remarks Before the U.S. Department of Justice Corporate Fraud 
Conference (Sept. 26, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch585.htm. 
While the SEC is a small agency, it serves many important functions. These include: 
"Protect[ing] Investors," "Maintain[ing] Fair, Honest, and Efficient Markets," "Facili­
tate[ing] Capital Formation," and "Sustain[ing] and Improv[ing] Organizational Excel­
lence." SEC, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT (GPRA), 2004 
ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN AND 2002 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 16 (2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/gpra2004_2002.pdf [hereinafter GOVERNMENT 
PERFORMANCE]. 
26. GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE, supra note 25, at 9-10; The Investor's Advo­
cate, supra note 24. 
27. The Securities Act of 1933 requires that companies register their securities 
with the SEC, and mandates that the information provided during the registration pro­
cess be accurate. 15 U.S.c. § 77(f) (2000); HAZEN 4th ed., supra note 24, at 2l. 
28. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created the SEC and requires corpora­
tions to file regular reports. 15 U.S.c. § 78(d) (2000); The Investor's Advocate, supra 
note 24. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 also prohibits insider trading, and re­
quires "a variety of market participants to register with the commission." SEC, The 
Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last vis­
ited Jan. 2, 2007); 15 U.S.c. §§ 780, 78p (2000); see also The Investor's Advocate, supra 
note 24. 
29. The Investor's Advocate, supra note 24; GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE, supra 
note 25, at 9-10. The SEC also uses the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 
the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the Invest­
ment Advisors Act of 1940 to reach these goals. The Investor's Advocate, supra note 
24; GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE, supra note 25, at 10. 
30. William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Testimony Concerning Implementa­
tion of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sept. 9, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
testimony/090903tswhd.htm [hereinafter "Testimony Concerning Implementation"]; 
Wilkins, supra note 2, at 339-40 (stating that the 1990s brought a lot of new investors 
into the stock market). Historically, only the wealthiest people invested in the stock 
market; however, in the 1990s many "ordinary people" started to use the stock market 
as a tool to save for retirement, or to grow their savings. Id. In the past two decades, 
the percentage of U.S. households investing in the stock market has grown from 20 to 
50 percent. Id.; see also Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the 
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another, and the financial markets began to fall.31 Between March 
2000 and September 2002, the falling stock markets caused an $8.5 
trillion drop in investors' net worth.32 In response to the failing 
markets and corporate scandals, Congress passed SOX.33 
The growing stock market of the 1990s created an environment 
that pressured companies to meet or exceed their goals every quar­
ter.34 However, corporations were not the only entities to blame 
for the environment that contributed to the corporate scandals.35 
Due to insufficient funding, the SEC did not have the financial re­
sources to investigate many of the potential scandals.36 Therefore, 
the pressures felt by companies in the 1990s, along with the weak­
ness of the SEC, provided the opportune climate for corporate mis­
behavior, and the resulting corporate scandals pushed the problems 
of corporate governance to the forefront. 
Between November 2001 and June 2002, Enron, Global Cross­
ing, Adelphia, and World Com all filed for bankruptcyY Because 
the number of stock market investors had grown, these scandals 
had a significant impact on the voting behavior of many Ameri­
cans.38 This led politicians to act quickly.39 The mid-term elections 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 127, 132 (2002); Cunningham, 
supra note 1, at 923-24. 
31. Cunningham, supra note 1, at 924-27. 
32. Aronson, supra note 30, at 127. 
33. [d. at 128; Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm'r, SEC, SEC Speech: SEC Initiatives 
Under Sarbanes-Oxley and Gramm-Leach-Bliley (Feb. 26, 2003), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch022603cag.htm. 
34. Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30. This compelled exec­
utives, auditors, and accountants to "stretch" the numbers. [d. A major problem dur­
ing this period was the dilemma of an investment banking securities analyst. Aronson, 
supra note 30, at 131. Investment banks often won big underwriting contracts by giving 
good analyst reports. [d. Therefore, in order to get big contracts, many analysts never 
recommended selling securities. [d. Also, there are reports that some analysts recom­
mended the stocks of the companies affected by the scandals-even as the companies 
were falling apart. Glassman, supra note 33. 
35. Aronson, supra note 30, at 131-32. This Note does not mean to suggest that a 
majority of corporate executives engage in unlawful conduct. Indeed, "the vast major­
ity of American businessmen and women are enterprising, honest and hardworking." 
Conference Report on Corporate Responsibility Legislation: Capitol Hill Hearing, FED. 
NEWS SERVICE (July 24, 2002), available at LEXIS; GENFED; FEDNEW (statement of 
Rep. Michael Oxley) [hereinafter Conference Report on Corporate Responsibility Legis­
lation]. Moreover, "[n]obody should assume that because there have been a very small 
number of people who had been irresponsible that this represents the American free 
enterprise system." [d. (statement of Rep. Paul Kanjorski). 
36. Aronson, supra note 30, at 131-32. 
37. Recine, supra note 6, at 1537. These were four of the largest bankruptcies in 
American history. [d. 
38. Wilkins, supra note 2, at 339-40. 
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of 2002 were around the corner, and the media attention that sur­
rounded the corporate scandals virtually guaranteed the Act's pas­
sage.40 Indeed, SOX was passed with little debate or opposition.41 
While SOX was passed in haste, and with little debate, it was 
not the first response to the growing problem of corporate govern­
ance. Before SOX, President George W. Bush had proposed what 
he described as a ten-point plan.42 The President's ten-point plan 
was focused on the investor and on correcting corporate govern­
ance problems.43 However, the President's plan received criticism 
from Republicans and Democrats alike, who claimed that the plan 
lacked sufficient "teeth" to deter corporate wrongdoers.44 Con­
gress was looking for a solution that would make corporate officers 
accountable.45 
Congress found its solution in SOX. SOX was passed "virtu­
39. Id. at 343. 
40. Romano, supra note 14, at 1523-24. 
41. Id. at 1528. In fact, even Republicans in Congress, who tend to lean more 
toward business freedom, did not oppose the bill. Id. They were afraid of what opposi­
tion to this Act could do to their careers. Id.; see also Wilkins, supra note 2, at 343 
(stating that SOX was passed in haste). 
42. Recine, supra note 6, at 1545-46; Bush, supra note 15. 
43. Bush, supra note 15. The ten points of the plan were: 
(1) Each investor should have quarterly access to the information needed to 
judge a firm's financial performance, condition, and risks. 
(2) Each investor should have prompt access to critical information. 
(3) CEOs should personally vouch for the veracity, timeliness, and fairness 
of their companies' public disclosures, including their financial 
statements. 
(4) CEOs or other officers should not be allowed to profit from erroneous 
financial statements. 
(5) CEOs or other officers who clearly abuse their power should lose their 
right to serve in any corporate leadership positions. 
(6) Corporate leaders should be required 	to tell the public promptly when­
ever they buy or sell company stock for personal gain. 
(7) Investors should have complete confidence in the independence and in­
tegrity of companies' auditors. 
(8) 	An independent regulatory board should ensure that the accounting pro­
fession is held to the highest ethical standards. 
(9) The authors of accounting standards must be responsive to the needs of 
investors. 
(10) Firms' accounting systems should be compared with best practices, not 
simply against minimum standards. 
Id. 
44. Recine, supra note 6, at 1545-46. Part of the problem with the President's 
plan was the absence of any increased criminal penalties. Id. at 1548. 
45. See Conference Report on Corporate Responsibility Legislation, supra note 35 
(statement of Rep. Michael Oxley) (stating that "corporate executives who break the 
law and abuse the public trust [must] pay severely"). 
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ally unanimously" by Congress,46 and has minimal clarifying legisla­
tive history.47 This led to criticism that SOX was not well thought 
out, and that the lack of debate would lead to problematic legisla­
tion.48 In fact, Republican Senator Phil Gramm, "who reversed his 
opposition to the bill, acknowledged that given the environment, 
'literally anything could have passed."'49 Consequently, due to 
pressure from the corporate scandals and the surrounding media 
attention, SOX passed with little opposition. 
2. Purpose and Goals 
a. Investor confidence 
After the corporate scandals, there was wide recognition that 
something had gone wrong in corporate America; as a result, many 
investors lost confidence in the failing markets.50 While investors 
had been able to shrug off the earlier failures of the dot-com com­
panies, it was harder to ignore the failures of larger, more estab­
lished corporations.51 Investor confidence had been shaken, and it 
was clear that in order to return investors to the market, something 
had to be done to restore their confidence.52 The main goals of 
SOX, therefore, were to restore investor confidence and protect in­
vestors from future corporate scandals.53 
46. Wilkins, supra note 2, at 343. The roll call vote in the House of Representa­
tives shows that there were 423 yeas, 3 nays, and 8 not voting. 148 CONGo REC. H5462, 
M5480 (daily ed. July 25, 2002). The Senate vote on the conference report was 99-0. 
148 CONGo REC. S7350 (daily ed. July 25, 2002). 
47. Gorman & Stewart, supra note 15, at 141-42. 
48. Romano, supra note 14, at 1528-29. Critics of the Act argue that, due to the 
Act's quick passage, a law was created that is disorganized and unnecessary. Michael 
A. Perino, Enron's Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 671, 672-74 (2002). 
49. Recine, supra note 6, at 1548-49 (quoting Marcy Gordon, Bush Receives Cor­
porate Reform Bill, Congress Gives Measure Easy O.K., CHI. TRIB., July 26, 2002, at 
11). 
50. Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30. 
51. Aronson, supra note 30, at 128. 
52. Glassman, supra note 33. 
53. Id. The SEC expects to reach these goals by improving corporate governance 
through SOX. Aulana Peters, Goodwin Seminar: Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Con­
gress' Response to Corporate Scandals: Will the New Rules Guarantee "Good" Govern­
ance and Avoid Future Scandals?, 28 NOVA L. REV. 283, 284-85 (2004). However, 
critics of the Act doubt SOX will improve corporate governance, and claim that these 
new proviSions will not change anything. Id. In fact, Enron's corporate governance 
plan would have satisfied the requirements of SOX. Id. 
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b. Corporate accountability and deterrence 
SOX regulates many different aspects of corporate lawY In 
many of its provisions, SOX creates disclosure requirements that 
are new to securities regulation.55 Some portions of the Act that 
help to ensure corporate accountability and deterrence are the code 
of ethics provision,56 the requirement that executives certify com­
pany reports,57 and the decreased standard for director removal,58 
All of the provisions take positive steps to help deter corporate mis­
behavior and provide a foundation for the SEC to promote disclo­
sure and to work with corporations to help ensure that investors are 
protected from wrongdoing. 59 
54. Robert C. Brighton, Jr., Sarbanes-Oxley: A Primer for Public Companies, and 
Their Officers and Directors, and Audit Firms, 28 NOVA L. REV. 605, 626-29 (2004). 
SOX regulates, among other things, CEO and CFO certifications, loans to directors and 
executive officers, whistleblower protection, forfeiture of bonus and share trading prof­
its, audit committees, "Real Time" disclosure, internal controls disclosure, pro forma 
financial information, extension of statutes of limitations, auditor oversight, and auditor 
independence and rotation. Id. 
55. Aronson, supra note 30, at 139, 148-50. 
56. 15 U.S.c. § 7264 (Supp. IV 2004). Section 406 of SOX provides that the SEC 
will make rules which require the public to be informed about a company's Code of 
Ethics. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 9.7(2) (5th ed. 
2005) [hereinafter HAZEN 5th ed.]. The purpose of this provision, and the rules 
adopted by the SEC pursuant to the Act, is to promote "honest and ethical conduct." 
Id.; 15 U.S.c. § 7264(c). As part of "honest and ethical" conduct, a company's code of 
ethics must include how a company would handle a conflict of interest, and must also 
encourage full disclosure of the company's SEC filings. Id.; HAZEN 5th ed., supra, at 
§ 9.7(2). 
57. 15 U.S.c. § 7241 (Supp. IV 2004); Testimony Concerning Implementation, 
supra note 30. 
58. Androphy & Graham, supra note 18, at 67. Previously, the standard required 
a potential board member be "substantially unfit"; today, the SEC only needs to prove 
that an individual is "unfit," thus lowering the standard. Id.; see also 15 U.S.c. 
§§ 77t(e), 78u(d)(2) (Supp. IV 2004). Previously, the SEC needed a court order to bar 
an officer; now the SEC is able to bar officers without a court order. Philip F.S. Berg, 
Unfit to Serve: Permanently Barring People from Serving as Officers and Directors of 
Publicly Traded Companies after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1871, 1887 
(2003). This provision has already had an impact on the way the SEC pursues corpo­
rate wrongdoers. In 2001, the SEC only sought to bar fifty-one officers from the board­
room; this figure increased to about 300 officers a year by 2004. Stephen M. Cutler, The 
Themes of Sarbanes-Oxley as Ref/ected in the Commission's Enforcement Program, IN­
SIGHTS, June 2004, at 18, 22. In fact, the SEC pursued a permanent bar of Gemstar's 
CEO when it filed charges against Gemstar. Press Release, SEC, SEC Sues Former 
CEO and CFO of Gemstar-TV Guide for Financial Fraud Scheme (June 19, 2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-75.htm. The SEC succeeded in barring 
Gemstar's CEO from the boardroom. SEC v. Yuen, No. CV-03-4376, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 34759, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2006). 
59. Two other provisions of SOX worth mentioning, because they are examples of 
an increased duty for executives to disclose, are: the requirement of insider transaction 
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C. Extraordinary Payments: Section 1103 
In order to help enforce the Act and to deter potential viola­
tors, SOX also contains provisions that give the SEC tools to punish 
corporate wrongdoers, and compensate harmed investors.6o One of 
these tools is section 1103.61 The SEC can use section 1103 to put 
into escrow any "extraordinary payments" made to CEOs and 
CFOs while the SEC is investigating possible securities violations.62 
If violations of SOX are found, the SEC can use the escrowed 
money to compensate investors.63 
1. Section 1103 
Section 1103 amends section 21C(c) of the 1934 Securities Ex­
change Act.64 Section 1l03(a) provides the SEC with the power to 
issue a temporary escrow order: 
Whenever during the course of a lawful investigation involving 
possible violations of the Federal Securities Laws by an issuer of 
publicly traded securities or any of its directors, officers, partners, 
controlling persons, agents, or employees, it shall appear to the 
Commission that it is likely that the issuer will make extraordi­
nary payments (whether compensatory or otherwise) to any of 
the foregoing persons, the Commission may petition a Federal 
District Court for a temporary order requiring the issuer to es­
crow, subject to court supervision, those payments in an interest 
bearing account for 45 days.65 
The remainder of section 1103 provides that the freeze be-
disclosures, and the prohibition on insider trading during pension blackouts. 15 U.S.c. 
§§ 7Sp, 7244 (Supp. IV 2004); Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30. 
The disclosure of insider transactions provides for earlier public notification of when 
securities have been traded by insiders. 15 U.S.c. § 7Sp(2); Testimony Concerning Im­
plementation, supra note 30. The prohibition on insider trading during pension black­
outs attempts to equalize the playing field among employees and executives in the sale 
of stock by preventing corporate officers from selling their stock when the corporation 
has imposed a pension blackout for the rest of the employees in the company. 15 
U.S.c. § 7244(1); Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30. 
60. Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30. 
61. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, tit. XI, § 1103(a), 116 Stat. 
745, S07-0S (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 7Su-3(c)(3) (Supp. IV 2004»; Testimony 
Concerning Implementation, supra note 30. 
62. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1103(a); 15 U.S.c. § 7Su-3(c)(3). This provi­
sion is not only for "extraordinary payments" paid out to CEOs and CFOs but also 
payments made to "directors, officers, partners, controlling persons, agents, or employ­
ees." Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1103(a); 15 U.S.c. § 78u-3(c)(3)(A)(i). 
63. Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30. 
64. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1103. 
65. [d. § 1l03(a) (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 78u-3(c)(3)(A)(i». 
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comes effective immediately, and is only effective for 45 days, un­
less the court grants an extension for another 45 days.66 There is 
also an exception: if charges are filed before the end of the period 
for which payments are frozen, then the freeze will stay in effect 
until the conclusion of the legal proceedings.67 If the executive is 
not charged with a violation of securities law within the freeze pe­
riod, the money is returned to the executive.68 
2. History and Purpose 
According to Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, "top execu­
tives will not be allowed to pilfer assets of the company by giving 
themselves huge bonuses and other extraordinary payments if the 
company is subject to an SEC investigation. "69 The legislative his­
tory on section 1103 demonstrates that Congress's intent in passing 
this section was to prevent executives from benefiting from their 
own misconduct.7° As Senator Trent Lott stated, the purpose of 
this provision was to "ensur[e] that corporate assets are not improp­
erly taken for an executive's personal benefit."71 
Prior to the passage of section 1103, the SEC had been able to 
freeze payments, but only after it had filed charges for a securities 
violation.72 The new provision allows the SEC to get a court order 
to freeze payments any time after it has commenced an investiga­
tion, thereby avoiding the possibility that corporate officers will 
plunder corporate assets before the SEC has enough evidence to 
66. Id. § 1103(a) (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 78u-3(c)(3)(A)(iii) to (iv)). 
67. Id. § 1103(a) (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 78u-3(c)(3)(B)(i)). 
68. Id. § 1103(a) (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 78u-3(c)(3)(B)(ii)). 
69. 148 CONGo REC. H4683, 4685 (daily ed. July 16, 2002). This coincides with a 
theme present throughout the Act: to aggressively pursue CEOs and CFOs who have 
committed wrongdoing. Otis Bilodeau, SEC to Go After Directors Who Ignore Fraud; 
Case Against Former Outside Board Member of Firm Will Be Model, CHI. SUN, Aug. 21, 
2004, at 51. 
70. 148 CONGo REC. H4683, 4685 (daily ed. July 16, 2002); 148 CONGo REC. S6524, 
6545 (daily ed. July 10,2002) (statement of Sen. Trent Lott). 
71. 148 CONGo REC. S6524, 6545 (daily ed. July 10, 2002). 
72. Wesley Bowen Gilchrist, Turning Up the Heat: The SEC's New Temporary 
Freeze Authority, 56 ALA. L. REV. 873,881 (2005). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
standard for freezing assets was much stricter than the standard under the Sarbanes­
Oxley Act. See Rice, supra note 21, at 2. Under the 1934 Act, the commission needed 
to prove that "a legitimate concern exist[ed]," and that if the assets were not frozen, the 
assets would disappear. /d. Also, the court was required to consider several factors, 
including whether the freeze would interfere with a company's business, whether the 
freeze was "narrowly tailored," the effect on the defendant, and whether the amount 
was more than the SEC could recover. Id. In contrast, the new provision requires only 
that "it 'appears to the commission' that an 'extraordinary payment' is likely to be made 
by an issuer." Id. at 3. 
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officially file charges.73 
Interestingly, the temporary freeze authority was initially pro­
posed by President Bush in July of 2002 as part of his corporate­
responsibility initiative.74 However, this freeze authority was not 
originally part of SOX.75 Senator Trent Lott introduced the provi­
sion as an amendment, which passed unanimously.76 Its purpose is 
to use corporate officers' golden parachutes to reimburse investors 
after the corporate officers have committed corporate 
wrongdoing.77 
The new SEC power was designed to increase investor confi­
dence.78 Congress's purpose was to prevent executives from bene­
fiting from misconduct while investors lose money.79 While this 
provision can help the SEC restore investor confidence, there re­
mains the question of what Congress meant by "extraordinary pay­
ments" as used in section 1103.80 Although the SEC has the ability 
to define this phrase, it has not done SO.81 The courts have been left 
to interpret what Congress meant by "extraordinary payments," 
and this is exactly what the Ninth Circuit did in Gemstar.82 
II. SEC v. GEMSTAR-TV GUIDE INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
A. Procedural History 
The Gemstar case arose when the SEC placed the termination 
packages of the CEO and the CFO of Gemstar-T.V. Guide Interna­
tional, Inc. into escrow.83 The district court granted the SEC's ap­
73. [d.; see also Rice, supra note 21, at 2 (stating that the purpose of section 1103 
was to stop executives from taking money from their own corporations). 
74. Gilchrist, supra note 72, at 880; see also Press Release, The White House, A 
New Ethic of Corporate Responsibility (July 9, 2002), available at http://www.white 
house.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020709.html. 
75. Gilchrist, supra note 72, at 881. 
76. [d. 
77. Pitt, supra note 25; Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30; 
Gilchrist, supra note 72, at 875. 
78. "This 'preventive measure' helps to address one of the toughest challenges 
facing the Commission-finding, recovering, and returning funds to defrauded inves­
tors-by securing funds before they are provided to alleged securities-law violators." 
Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30. 
79. 148 CONGo REc. H4683, 4685 (daily ed. July 16, 2002). 
80. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, tit. XI, § 1103(a), 116 Stat. 
745,807-08 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.c. § 78u-3(c)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 2004». 
81. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005). 
82. [d. 
83. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., No. CV 03-3124, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8707 (C.O. Cal. 2003), affd, 401 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 416 
(2005). 
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plication in accordance with section 1103 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.84 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's rul­
ing due to a lack of evidence establishing that the payments were 
"extraordinary."85 The judgment was subsequently vacated and re­
manded.86 Later, the Ninth Circuit ordered the case re-heard en 
banc.87 The en bane hearing led to the reversal of the original 
Ninth Circuit ruling.88 The court concluded that the payments were 
"extraordinary payments." The result of the original dissenting 
opinion became the result of the majority opinion, and the result of 
the original majority opinion became the result of the dissenting 
opinion.89 
B. The Gemstar Case 
1. The Facts of the Case 
In April 2002, Gemstar filed its lO-K report for 2001.90 The 
report stated $107.6 million in revenue that had not been realized.91 
In August 2002, Gemstar filed a Form 8-K92 announcing that it had 
overstated revenue by $20 million and that the company was going 
to restate its financial results for 2001, reversing the $20 million fig­
ure.93 Gemstar also announced that Dr. Henry Yuen, the, Chief Ex­
ecutive Officer, and Elsie Leung, the Chief Financial Officer, would 
not be able to certify that Gemstar's financial statements were accu­
84. Id. at *1. 
85. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 367 F.3d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 2004), 
reh'g granted en banc, 384 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2004), dist. ct. affd, 401 F.3d 1031 (9th 
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 416 (2005). 
86. Id. 
87. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 384 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2004), dist. ct. 
affd, 401 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 416 (2005). 
88. See SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'!, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2005) (af­
firming the district court's ruling), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 416 (2005). 
89. See id. 
90. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1036. A lO-K report is a report that publicly traded 
companies must file with the SEC annually. The report gives an overview that includes 
the audited financial statements of the company and the company's business and finan­
cial information. SEC, lO-K, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form10k.htm (last visited Jan. 
2, 2007); see also SEC v. Yuen, No. CV 03-4376, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33938, at *18 
(CD. Cal. Mar. 16, 2006). 
91. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1036. This announcement caused Gemstar's stock to 
drop by 37 percent. Id. 
92. An 8-K report is a report that a company must file to announce an event of 
which the stockholders must be informed. SEC, 8-K, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form 
8k.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2007); see also Yuen, No. CV 03-4376, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
33938, at *18. 
93. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1036. 
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rate, as required by SOX.94 Then in September 2002, another Form 
8-K was filed: 
(1) confirming that [the corporation] had been notified by NAS­
DAQ that its securities were subject to delisting for failure timely 
to file a Form lO-Q for the quarter ending on June 30, 2002; (2) 
that because of an unresolved dispute between Gemstar and its 
independent auditor KPMG, the company could not file its quar­
terly Form 10-Q report; and (3) that the resolution of these ac­
counting and financial statements was "uncertain" and 
"unpredictable."95 
After these events, it was obvious that Gemstar was in trouble, and 
that something had gone wrong within the company.96 
It then became clear that Yuen and Leung might have had ad­
vance knowledge of the company's financial problems. Yuen had 
sold seven million shares of Gemstar stock only four days before 
Gemstar announced its overstatement of revenue.97 Also, while 
Gemstar was falling apart, both Yuen and Leung were "cutting a 
new deal with Gemstar's Board to 'resign' from their respective ex­
ecutive positions," yet remain as employees in other capacities.98 
These attempts included negotiations for monetary compensation.99 
Yuen's package included over $29 million in cash and more than 5 
million shares of restricted stock, and Leung's package included 
$8.16 million in cash, the right to purchase 1.1 million shares of 
common stock, and 353,680 shares of restricted stock or stock op­
tions. lOo The SEC then commenced an investigation into Gemstar's 
revenue misstatements.101 
Once the investigation was underway, the SEC asked both 
94. [d. at 1037. 
95. [d. A lO-Q report is similar to a lO-K report, but is filed quarterly, instead of 
annually. The report includes the company's financials and unedited financial state­
ments. The report is filed for each of the first three quarters of the year. lO-Q, http:// 
www.sec.gov/answers/forml0q.htm(lastvisitedJan.2.2007);seealsoYuen.No.CV 03­
4376,2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33938, at *18. 
96. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1037. 
97. [d. 
98. [d. It should be noted that while the court did use the term "resign" to de­
scribe the negotiations between Yuen, Leung, and the Gemstar board, the court did 
place the term in quotation marks, suggesting that Yuen and Leung were at the very 
least being asked to resign, if not being forced to. See id. 
99. [d. 
100. [d. The packages were reported by Gemstar in an 8-K filing in November 
2002. [d. 
101. [d. 
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Yuen and Leung to put their termination payments into escrow.102 
Both initially declined to do so, but Gemstar informed them that 
the payments would be held in escrow for six months.103 One day 
before the expiration of the six-month escrow period, the SEC peti­
tioned to freeze Yuen and Leung's payments pursuant to section 
1103 of SOX.104 Thus, the issue for the court was whether these 
payments were "extraordinary" within the context of section 1103. 




The three opinions of the Ninth Circuit in the Gemstar case­
the majority, the concurrence, and the dissent-all proposed differ­
ent tests for deciding when a payment is an "extraordinary pay­
ment." The majority implemented a multi-factor test to determine 
the definition of an "extraordinary" payment. The dissent sug­
gested an industry comparison test, and the concurrence suggested 
a bright-line rule. 
a. 	 The majority approach: out of the ordinary 
The Gemstar majority first decided that "extraordinary" means 
"out of the ordinary," and that "out of the ordinary" means "a pay­
ment that would not typically be made by a company in its custom­
ary course of business.''105 The court then determined the test 
should be "a fact based and flexible inquiry."lo6 Previously, the dis­
trict court had looked at "[c]ontext-specific factors such as the cir­
cumstances under which the payment is contemplated or made, the 
purpose of the payment, and the size of the payment," and the 
Ninth Circuit agreed that these factors might be used to help decide 
whether a payment is "extraordinary."107 However, the court re­
jected the idea that there must be a nexus between the alleged mis­
conduct and the payment in order for the SEC to temporarily 
102. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 367 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2004), 
reh'g granted en banc, 384 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2004), dist. ct. affd, '401 F.3d 1031 (9th 
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 416 (2005); 2 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR § 32:10 
(Thomson West 2005) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR]. 
103. Gemstar, 367 F.3d at 1089; EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR, supra note 102, 
§ 32:10. 
104. Gemstar, 367 F.3d at 1089-90; Rice, supra note 21, at 4. 
105. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1045. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
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freeze the payments.108 A nexus may be used to show that the pay­
ment was "extraordinary," but is not a requirement.109 Addition­
ally, the court stated that "deviation from an 'industry standard'­
or the practice of similarly situated businesses-might also reveal 
whether a payment is extraordinary."110 
Even though the Ninth Circuit's majority opinion provided 
some factors to use in deciding if a payment is "extraordinary," it 
stressed that "the statute does not compel any specific method of 
making the determination but allows for the consideration of a vari­
ety of factors, as the situation may warrant."111 The majority fo­
cused on the size of the payments at issue as compared to an 
executive's usual salary, and on the fact that the termination pay­
ments were different than those provided for in an officer's employ­
ment contract.1l2 According to the court, the termination packages 
of Yuen and Leung were "not business as usual."113 
b. The dissenting approach: industry comparison 
The dissenting judge, Carlos T. Bea, suggested that the stan­
dard for determining "extraordinary payments" should require the 
SEC to "present evidence that a payment was extraordinary rela­
tive to payments made by other comparable companies, under cir­
cumstances which have not resulted in an investigation by securities 
agencies, but which are otherwise comparable."114 He then sug­
gested two factors that could be used to identify a comparable com­
pany.l1S These factors were: (1) "size," and (2) "the industry or 
market in which they do business."116 The judge also set out three 
factors that might be used to show "comparable circumstances."117 
These factors included: (1) "the position of those whose employ­
ment is being terminated," (2) "the length of their tenure," and (3) 
"the reason their employment was terminated."118 
108. Id. The court did not define "nexus," but used "nexus" and "connection" 
interchangeably. See id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. Therefore, the appeals court concluded that the district court was correct 
in refusing to set out a specific test to determine whether the payments made to Yuen 
and Leung were "extraordinary payments." Id. at 1045-46. 
112. Id. at 1046. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 1051 (Bea, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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The dissent argued that the majority erred in two ways.119 
First, the majority interpreted" 'extraordinary payments' to mean 
'payments under extraordinary circumstances."'120 Second, by cre­
ating a test that is not based on a comparison to other companies, 
but is based on a comparison to the company making the payment 
"any payment made under any situation novel to that company is 
now subject to escrow."121 Judge Bea also suggested that the ma­
jority had confused its own standard by claiming that in some cir­
cumstances comparison to other industries may be appropriate, but 
in other circumstances it is not appropriate.122 The majority opin­
ion does not explain which circumstances require the application of 
which standard.123 
According to Judge Bea, a comparison-based test would be 
more workable for the district courts to apply.124 Consequently, be­
cause the SEC did not offer any proof that the payments to Yuen 
and Leung were not similar to other comparable companies' termi­
nation packages, Judge Bea opined that the district court's ruling 
should be reversed.125 
c. The concurring approach: a bright-line rule 
The concurring opinion by Judge Reinhardt agreed that the 
payments to Yuen and Leung were "extraordinary," but did not 
agree with the test the majority opinion created to make that deter­
mination.126 Judge Reinhardt would have held "that all severance 
packages due top corporate officers and officials, and any other 
substantial non-routine payments to which they may be entitled, 
constitute 'extraordinary payments' that the district court may or­
der placed in escrow temporarily."127 He noted that the purpose of 
the Act was to temporarily freeze payments not usually made in the 
"ordinary course of business," and since severance payments are 
never made in the "ordinary course of business," they should al­





124. ld. at 1056-57. The dissenting judge also argued that district courts have 
more experience applying the analysis set forth in the dissent's test than they do the one 
set out in the majority's test. Id. 
125. Id. at 1057-58. 
126. Id. at 1048 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
127. Id. 
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ways be considered "extraordinary payments."128 
Judge Reinhardt argued the importance of a bright-line rule in 
order to facilitate an SEC investigation. 129 He also stated that the 
factors the majority relied on in deciding whether a payment is "ex­
traordinary" do not suit the purpose of the Act.130 He believed 
that, regardless of the circumstances, payments made outside of the 
ordinary course of business should be considered "extraordinary," 
because that would serve the purpose of the Act.131 
3. Extraordinary Expenses 
Both the majority and dissenting opinions referred to three 
prior Ninth Circuit cases which have interpreted the phrase "ex­
traordinary expenses."132 The majority used these cases to show 
that the courts used comparable reasoning in the past to interpret a 
phrase similar to "extraordinary payments."133 However, the dis­
sent stated that the "extraordinary expense" cases did not apply be­
cause in those cases the court had either misinterpreted the 
reasoning in the case, or "the governing statute or rule of law" 134 
128. Id. at 1049. 
129. Id. Judge Reinhardt explained that the SEC is in the early part of its investi­
gation when trying to place these payments into escrow, and therefore, does not have 
much relevant information. Id. (citing Floor Statement of Rep. Baker, 148 CONGo REC. 
H4683-01 (daily ed. July 16, 2002». Consequently, using a bright-line rule to place 
these payments into escrow would help the SEC speed up their investigation. 
130. Id. at 1050. Judge Reinhardt argued that it is possible for payments to be 
"extraordinary," even if the payments are comparable to the officer's salary, if there 
would not be adequate funds "to provide for disgorgement should the allegations prove 
true." Id. 
131. Id. Judge Reinhardt pointed out that the majority agreed with him as to the 
purpose of the Act, that is, "to prevent wrongdoers from depleting the corporate trea­
sury and to ensure that there are adequate funds to provide for disgorgement should 
the allegations of fraud prove to be true," and stated that the only way to conform to 
the purpose of the Act is to declare that all severance packages are "extraordinary 
payments." Id. 
132. Atlanta-One, Inc. v. SEC, 100 F.3d 105 (9th Cir. 1996); Sousa v. Miguel, 32 
F.3d 1370 (9th CiT. 1994); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Local Union No. 137, Int'l Bhd. of Team­
sters, 623 F.2d 1354 (9th CiT. 1980). 
133. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1045 n.2 (majority opinion). 
134. The statutes and rule of law that the dissenting judge referred to are in Sousa 
and Frito-Lay, Inc. Sousa, 32 F.3d 1370; Frito-Lay, Inc., 623 F.2d 1354. In Sousa v. 
Miguel, the court relied on 11 U.S.c. § 330(a)(2) (2000). Sousa, 32 F.3d at 1377. The 
court interpreted this section to mean that "trustees are not entitled to reimbursement 
for normal overhead expenses under § 330(a)(2)." Id. For the rule of law, the dissent­
ing judge referred to Frito-Lay, Inc., which cited to many different cases where "ex­
traordinary expenses, not normal to [the company's own] business operation" had been 
awarded. See Frito-Lay, Inc., 623 F.2d at 1365 n.11 (citing Mason-Rust v. Laborers' 
Int'l Union, Local 42, 435 F.2d 939, 947 (8th Cir. 1970); Abbott v. Local 142, Journey­
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explicitly required a comparison of the "extraordinary expenses" 
and "the company's past practices."135 
In Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Local Union No. 137, International Broth­
erhood of Teamsters,136 the Ninth Circuit looked to the day-to-day 
operations of the business in examining a particular payment. 
Frito-Lay sued the Union, stating that the Union had forced Frito­
Lay into negotiating collectively with other like companies in order 
to obtain a contract for its workers.137 The court found the union 
liable, and interpreted "extraordinary expenses" when calculating 
damages.138 The court defined "extraordinary expenses" as ex­
penses that are "not normal to its business operation, [and] in­
curred as a result of the Union's illegal strike."139 Similarly, in both 
Atlanta-One, Inc. v. SEC140 and Sousa v. Miguel,141 the court de­
fined "extraordinary expenses" as expenses that were not part of 
the day-to-day expenses of that particular business. 
The holdings in the three cases cited above are clear: "ex­
traordinary expenses" are expenses that are not part of every-day 
men & Apprentices of the Pipefitting Indus., 429 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1970); Sheet Metal 
Workers, Local 223 v. Atlas Sheet Metal Co., 384 F.2d 101, 109 (5th Cir. 1967); Coal Co. 
v. United Mine Workers of Am., 303 F.2d 39, 46 (6th Cir. 1962); Engineers v. Dahlem 
Const. Co., 193 F.2d 470, 472 (6th Cir. 1951); Vulcan Materials Co. v. United Steel 
Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 316 F. Supp. 509, 525 (N.D. Ala. 1969». 
135. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1055 n.3 (Bea, J., dissenting). The dissent claimed that 
the majority misread Atlanta-One, Inc. v. SEC. Id. The dissenting judge stated that the 
Atlanta-One court did not compare the "extraordinary expense" to the day-to-day ex­
penses of the business, "but to what the 'reasonable' broker might charge." Id. 
136. Frito-Lay, Inc., 623 F.2d 1354. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 1362. 
139. Id. at 1365 n.l1. 
140. Atlanta-One, Inc. v. SEC, 100 F.3d 105 (9th Cir. 1996). In Atlanta-One, the 
SEC brought an action against Atlanta-One, a brokerage firm, for charging customers 
unfair commissions. Id. at 106. The brokers claimed that because they incurred high 
expenses, the commissions were justified. Id. at 107. The court looked to the com­
pany's daily expenses to see if they had incurred "extraordinary expenses." Id. By 
looking only at the company's past expenses, the court decided that the company had 
not incurred "extraordinary expenses." Id. at 107-08. The court also stated that even if 
the company had incurred "extraordinary expenses," it would not have been allowed to 
pass them on to customers through high commissions. Id. at 108. 
141. Sousa v. Miguel, 32 F.3d 1370 (9th Cir. 1994). In Sousa, the court held that a 
trustee in a bankruptcy case can only be reimbursed for office expenses that are "ex­
traordinary." Id. at 1376-77. The court interpreted the relevant statute, 11 U.S.c. 
§ 330, to mean that the trustee could not be reimbursed for "normal [overhead] ex­
penses" but only for "extraordinary expenses." Id. at 1377; see supra note 134. The 
court defined "extraordinary expenses" to mean "expenses incurred in the administra­
tion of a specific estate, not what they generally spend running their office." Sousa, 32 
F.3d at 1376-77. 
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business operations. However, two of the approaches advocated in 
Gemstar disagree with this interpretation of "extraordinary," and 
take unworkable positions. The one workable approach, which is 
also true to the court's past interpretation of "extraordinary," is 
that of the concurring opinion. While the holding in the Gemstar 
case is correct, the majority did not fully consider the purpose be­
hind SOX in its interpretation of "extraordinary payments." In 
contrast, the concurring approach took the purpose of the Act into 
consideration and therefore, it is the approach courts should use 
when determining whether a payment is "extraordinary."142 
III. ANALYSIS 
The purpose of section 1103 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is to 
provide a mechanism for the SEC to withhold funds from potential 
corporate wrongdoers in order to reimburse investors for violations 
of securities law.143 This provision has the potential to strengthen 
both the effect of SOX and the power of the SEC.I44 Conse­
quently, it is important that the SEC be able to use section 1103 
effectively. The concurring opinion in the Gemstar case allows this 
by providing an easy-to-apply bright-line rule that all severance 
payments are "extraordinary payments."145 
A. An Effective Test for Section 1103 is Necessary 
The purpose of SOX is clear: to increase investor confidence in 
corporate America amidst failing corporate governance systems.146 
However, the role of section 1103 is unclear. Section 1103 states 
that the SEC can petition the district court for an order placing the 
142. Litigation subsequent to the Ninth Circuit's re-hearing resulted in Yuen and 
Lueng's payments being placed into escrow, and Yuen being found guilty of securities 
fraud, for violating "the periodic reporting, record keeping, and internal control re­
quirements," and making misrepresentations to auditors. SEC v. Yuen, No. CV 03­
4376,2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33938, at *98, *114, *121 (CD. Cal. Mar. 16,2006). After 
Yuen was found guilty of these violations, an additional hearing was held on the issue of 
remedies. See SEC v. Yuen, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34759 (CD. Cal. May 8, 2006). 
After the hearing on remedies, the court entered a "Final Judgment Imposing Perma­
nent Injunction, Disgorgement, Prejudgment Interest, Civil Penalty, and Permanent Of­
ficer and Director Bar Against Defendant Henry C Yuen." [d. at *4. 
143. See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text. 
144. Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30; see also Conference 
Report on Corporate Responsibility Legislation, supra note 35 (statement of Sen. Tim 
Johnson) (stating that this legislation would strengthen the SEC). 
145. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031, 1048-51 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(Reinhardt, J., concurring), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 416 (2005). 
146. Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30. 
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payments into escrow if it "appears to the Commission that it is 
likely that the issuer will make extraordinary payments (whether 
compensation or otherwise)."147 This language does not give a 
"substantive standard that the SEC must meet in order to obtain an 
asset freeze."148 Consequently, the Act itself does not provide a 
test that the SEC can use to implement section 1103. 
The importance of having an effective test might easily be 
overlooked because during an SEC investigation it will usually ben­
efit a corporation to cooperate with the SEC and agree to put pay­
ments into escrow.149 This is illustrated by the Gemstar case. 
Gemstar did not oppose putting both Yuen's and Leung's payments 
into escrow. 150 Instead, it was Yuen and Leung, individually, who 
brought suit against the SEC to keep their severance packages out 
of escrow.151 Therefore, having an effective test is important be­
cause of the likelihood of litigation; even if a corporation does not 
oppose putting a severance payment into escrow, the executive will 
most likely oppose placing the payments into escrow, and will file 
suit against the SEC. 
Additionally, a clear test for the implementation of section 
1103 will allow the SEC to be more effective. Even the SEC is 
unclear about what exactly constitutes an "extraordinary pay­
ment. "152 This uncertainty leads to unnecessary litigation and work 
for the SEC. A straightforward test will allow the SEC to adminis­
147. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, tit. XI, § l103(a), 116 Stat. 
745, 807-08 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.c. § 78u-3(c)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 2004». 
148. Rice, supra note 21, at 3. This does not give the business community a stan­
dard they can use to predict whether a payment will be put into escrow. Id. at 4. An 
example of this can be seen in the Gemstar case. Before the SEC put Yuen and Leung's 
payments into escrow, Gemstar asked the SEC for guidance in regard to the payments. 
Id. The SEC was unable to offer any guidance because they were unsure what consti­
tuted an "extraordinary payment." Id. 
149. Id. at 3. By not objecting to the SEC request to put the payments in escrow, 
the corporation can avoid a large expenditure during the investigation. Id. 
150. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(majority opinion), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 416 (2005). In fact, Gemstar agreed to freeze 
both Yuen and Leung's payments for six months before the SEC applied to put the 
payments in escrow under section 1103. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 367 F.3d 
1087,1089 (9th Cir. 2004), reh'g granted en banc, 384 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2004), dist. ct. 
affd, 401 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 416 (2005); EMPLOYMENT 
COORDINATOR, supra note 102, § 32:10. 
151. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1034. Yuen and Leung's severance packages had been 
in escrow for six months before the SEC petitioned to place them into escrow pursuant 
to section 1103, because Gemstar had voluntarily placed them there at the request of 
the SEC. Gemstar, 367 F.3d at 1089; EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR, supra note 102, 
§ 32:10. 
152. Rice, supra note 21, at 4. 
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ter this section effectively. By allowing for more effective imple­
mentation, SOX will have sharper teeth, and, in turn, will help 
deter executives from violating securities laws. 
Unfortunately, neither the majority nor the dissenting Gemstar 
opinions provide guidance for the establishment of a clear and ef­
fective test. The test set forth in the majority opinion is unwork­
able,153 and the dissenting opinion's definition of "extraordinary 
payment" is too narrow and places the burden on the SEC.154 On 
the other hand, the concurring opinion creates a concise and effec­
tive test that enforces the purpose of the Act, makes the provision 
easy to administer, and helps deter violations of securities law. 
B. The Majority Approach is Ineffective 
With Gemstar, the Ninth Circuit recognized the importance 
and purpose behind section 1103. Unfortunately, the majority 
opinion did not create a test that adheres to this purpose, thereby 
hindering effective implementation of section 1103. The majority 
opinion acknowledged the impact of corporate scandals on investor 
confidence.155 However, after recognizing the importance of this 
provision, the majority then set out a "vague and multi-faceted 
test" that does not provide effective guidance.156 
First, the majority opinion contradicts the legislative history of 
section 1103.157 Congress's intent was to implement an effective 
provision that helps the SEC in preventing a CEO or CFO from 
taking "huge bonuses" while their company is being investigated, 
153. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1051 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
154. Rice, supra note 21, at 7. If the SEC is unclear about the definition of an 
"extraordinary payment," how is the rest of the business community supposed to know 
how to define an "extraordinary payment?" See supra note 148. 
155. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1035-36 (majority opinion). The court acknowledged 
that before section 1103 was passed, "[b]y the time the authorities hard] been alerted to 
the fraud, it [was] too late; the assets of the company hard] already disappeared, render­
ing the traditional remedies used by the Commission to rectify such wrongs-disgorge­
ment, civil penalties, restitution, etc.-difficult, if not impossible, to pursue." [d. at 
1035. 
156. [d. at 1048 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
157. See 148 CONGo REC. H4685 (daily ed. July 16, 2002) (stating that executives 
should not be able to take assets from a corporation when it is under investigation by 
the SEC); see also 148 CONGo REc. S6545 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (stating that execu­
tives should not be able to take assets for their own benefit when they have acted im­
properly). Even the majority in Gemstar stated that "the intent of Congress in enacting 
this statute was to provide a strong shield for third-party creditors and corporate inves­
tors once the SEC begins an investigation of corporate malfeasance." Gemstar, 401 
F.3d at 1036 (majority opinion). The majority's test does not accomplish this goal. 
252 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:231 
leaving investors with nothing.15s The test the majority opinion cre­
ated does not effectively help the SEC reach this goal; instead, it 
creates an unworkable test, making it more difficult to prevent 
harm to investors.159 
The majority's test sets out factors to help determine whether a 
payment is an "extraordinary payment." These factors are: (1) "the 
circumstances under which the payment is contemplated or made," 
(2) "the purpose of the payment," and (3) "the size of the pay­
ment."160 These factors are sUbjective and are difficult to adminis­
ter.161 In fact, these factors are not even determinative of whether 
the payment is "extraordinary," they are only factors that may be 
considered when determining whether a payment is "extra­
ordinary."162 
This vague standard fails to offer any real guidance to the dis­
trict courts in deciding whether a payment is an "extraordinary pay­
ment." The district courts must wade through each factor, and then 
decide which are the most important.163 While "[s]tandards that 
call for an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances are, of 
course, well known to the law,"164 where a less burdensome test 
coincides with the legislative intent, the more complex multi-factor 
test becomes unnecessary.165 Because the concurring opinion pro­
158. 148 CONGo REc. H4685 (daily ed. July 16, 2002); see Conference Report on 
Corporate Responsibility Legislation, supra note 35 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) 
("[W]hile we can't stop greed, we can stop greed from succeeding."); see also supra 
note 155. 
159. Gemstar,401 F.3d at 1051 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
160. Id. at 1045 (majority opinion). 
161. See id. at 1048 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (stating that the majority's test 
contains complex factors); see also id. at 1051 (stating that the majority opinion is 
unworkable). 
162. Id. at 1045 (majority opinion). 
163. It seems that this was not the intention of Congress when it changed the 
standard for the SEC to freeze payments. The pre-SOX standard for freezing payments 
involved a multi-factor test. See supra note 72. Under section 1103, Congress allows 
the SEC to put payments into escrow, thereby getting rid of the old multi-factor test. 
Id. The intention was clearly to make it easier for the SEC to put the payments into 
escrow. [d. It does not seem that Congress intended to get rid of one burdensome 
multi-factor test just to replace it with another. [d. 
164. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1055 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
165. See id. at 1048 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) ("I do not believe however, that 
Congress intended courts to apply a vague and multi-faceted test that requires consider­
ation of the purpose, circumstances, and size of the benefits, as well as other more 
complex factors ...."). In fact, the Ninth Circuit has stated in several cases concerning 
police officer stops that "[w]hen courts invoke multi-factor tests, balancing of interests 
or fact-specific weighing of circumstances, this introduces a troubling degree of uncer­
tainty and unpredictability into the process; no one can be sure whether a particular 
combination of factors will justify a stop until a court has ruled on it." United States V. 
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vides a less burdensome test, which also effectively implements the 
intent behind the legislation, the multi-factor test of the majority is 
unnecessary and should be rejected. 
Second, the confusion created by the majority opinion does not 
end with which factors should be used to evaluate a payment. It 
continues with the majority's statement that the payments should 
be compared to what a particular company does on a day-to-day 
basis, and then suggests comparisons to payments made by other 
corporations.166 The dissenting opinion pointed out the confusion 
this could cause in implementing the majority's test: these internal 
and external tests could, at times, be in conflict with one another.167 
It is unclear which test, the internal or the external, should be fa­
vored in such circumstances. Consequently, the majority did not 
create a straightforward test that the SEC will be able to administer 
with ease. Instead, the majority's test creates the potential for con­
flict and thwarts the effective implementation of section 1103. 
Third, the majority inappropriately defined "extraordinary" by 
analogy to the "extraordinary expense" cases. The majority opin­
ion used the definition of "extraordinary" to support its theory that 
the correct test to use is one based on a flexible inquiry.168 The 
court defined "extraordinary" to mean "out of the ordinary."169 It 
then noted that "out of the ordinary" had been defined before, 
when the Ninth Circuit had interpreted "extraordinary ex­
penses."170 The "extraordinary expense" cases claim that "ex-
Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1142 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., concurring); see 
also United States v. Arvizu, 232 F.3d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Montero­
Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1142); United States v. Sigmond-Ballesteros, 247 F.3d 943, 947 
(9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1142). While here the court is 
dealing with securities law, and not police stops, the multi-factor test invoked still leads 
to "uncertainty and unpredictability." While in the above cases the court did not use a 
strict bright-line approach, it did recognize that only the most relevant factors should be 
used. Sigmond-Ballesteros, 247 F.3d at 947 (citing Arvizu, 232 F.3d at 1248; Montero­
Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1132). In this case, getting rid of the "uncertainty and unpredict­
ability" can easily be done by declaring every severance payment an "extraordinary 
payment," instead of forcing the courts to litigate the question in each instance. See 
Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites to Filesharing: Personal Use in Cyberspace, 35 GA. L. 
REV. 1129, 1183 (2001) ("Multi-factor tests, applied case by case, make litigation the 
only venue for defining the scope of permissible use."). 
166. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1045 (majority opinion). 
167. Jd. at 1055 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
168. Jd. 
169. [d. at 1045 (majority opinion). 
170. Jd. at 1045 n.2; see also Atlanta-One, Inc. v. SEC, 100 F.3d 105, 108 (9th Cir. 
1996); Sousa v. Miguel, 32 F.3d 1370, 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1994); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Local 
Union No. 137, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 623 F.2d 1354, 1365 n.11 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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traordinary" means expenses not part of the day-to-day running of 
the business. l71 The Gemstar majority used these cases to deter­
mine that "extraordinary" meant the same thing in this instance. l72 
However, there are two problems with the Gemstar majority's in­
terpretation of these earlier cases. 
To begin with, severance packages paid to high-level employ­
ees are not "business as usual."173 Therefore, such payments are 
never going to be "normal to its business operation."174 Also, there 
is no correlation between the definition of "extraordinary" that the 
court used and the multi-factor test that the court then imple­
mented. Nowhere in any of the "extraordinary expense" cases did 
the court use a multi-factor test to decide if an expense was an "ex­
traordinary" onePS In Gemstar, the majority provided no explana­
tion as to why it jumped from the definition of "extraordinary" to 
deciding that a multi-factor test was necessary.176 Consequently, 
the court's reliance on a multi-factor test was misplaced. 
While the majority's opinion is a "middle ground"l77 between 
171. Atlanta-One, Inc., 100 F.3d at 107; Sousa, 32 F.3d at 1376-77; Frito-Lay, Inc., 
623 F.2d at 1365 n.l1. 
172. Gemstar,401 F.3d at 1045 n.2. 
173. Id. at 1046. 
174. Frito-Lay, Inc., 623 F.2d at 1365 n.l1. Examples of this can be seen in the 
severance packages of several CEOs. If fired, the CEO of Clear Channel Communica­
tions would receive a severance package worth $28 million. Gordon T. Anderson, Want 
a Big Payday? Get Fired: If You're a Captain of Industry, the Day you Leave Might be 
the Most Profitable of All, CNN MONEY, Apr. 30, 2003, http://money.cnn.com/2003/04/ 
29/pf/investinglceo_severance/index.htm. The CEO of Home Depot recently received 
"an exit package valued at about $210 million, including $20 million in cash severance." 
Joann S. Lublin et aI., Moving Out: Behind Nardelli's Abrupt Exit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 
2007, at AI. These payments are not part of the day-to-day management of businesses. 
Therefore, according to the definition of "ordinary" in the "extraordinary expenses" 
cases, severance packages will always be "extraordinary." 
175. See generally Atlanta-One, Inc., 100 F.3d 105; Sousa, 32 F.3d 1370; Frito-Lay, 
Inc., 623 F.2d 1354. In all of the "extraordinary expense" cases, the court looked only 
at whether the expenses were part of the day-to-day running of the business. Atlanta­
One, Inc., 100 F.3d at 107; Sousa, 32 F.3d at 1376-77; Frito-Lay, Inc., 623 F.2d at 1365. 
The courts adopted a bright-line rule: if the expenses were part of the day-to-day run­
ning of the business they were "ordinary expenses," and if not, then they were "ex­
traordinaryexpenses." Atlanta-One, Inc., 100 F.3d at 107; Sousa, 32 F.3d at 1376-77; 
Frito-Lay, Inc., 623 F.2d at 1365. Using the definition of "extraordinary" in these cases 
would support the notion that severance packages given to executives are not part of 
the daily running of a business; therefore, they will always be "extraordinary." 
176. In fact, all the court stated was that "[t]he standard of comparison is the 
company's common or regular behavior. Thus, the determination of whether a pay­
ment is extraordinary will be a fact-based and flexible inquiry." Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 
1045 (emphasis added). 
177. Gilchrist, supra note 72, at 896. 
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the concurring and dissenting opinions, this alone is not a sufficient 
reason to use its test to interpret "extraordinary payments." Propo­
nents of the majority's test state that it is "[a] flexible, multi-factor 
test [ that] will allow the SEC to obtain a freeze where the circum­
stances surrounding the company under investigation indicate that 
investors would not otherwise be able to protect themselves."178 
However, the reality is that the test may cause confusion and does 
not provide clear guidance to the SEC or the courts. Consequently, 
the majority's test is "unworkable,"179 and will not be effective in 
enforcing securities law. 
C. The Dissenting Approach is Too Narrow and Burdensome 
The dissent's test for "extraordinary payments" is a narrow test 
that places the burden directly on the SEC, which is contrary to the 
intent of Congress.180 The legislative intent in passing this provi­
sion was to make it more difficult for executives to take money 
from a corporation while it is under investigation by the SEC;181 
however, the dissent's test does not meet this objective.182 The crux 
of the dissent's test is whether similar companies, which have not 
been investigated by the SEC, have made similar payments.183 This 
test is too narrow, and it undercuts the purpose of the Act. 
The dissent's test thwarts the effective implementation of sec­
tion 1103 just as the majority's test does. The dissent set out five 
178. Id. 
179. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1051 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
180. Rice, supra note 21, at 2. 
181. 148 CONGo REc. H4685 (daily ed. July 16,2002) (statement of Rep. Sensen­
brenner) (explaining that the bill would make it much more difficult for executives to 
"pilfer" from companies under investigation); 148 CONGo REC. S6545 (daily ed. July 10, 
2002) (statement of Sen. Lott) (describing the escrow provisions). This is apparent 
when one looks at the change in the SEC's freeze authority from the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See supra note 72. The standard was much 
harder to meet under the 1934 Act, and included several factors. Id. 
182. The dissent's test "fails to focus on why a freeze is necessary in the first 
place," that is, to stop executives from taking assets from the corporation when the SEC 
is investigating corporate wrongdoing. Rice, supra note 21, at 8. If the dissent's test 
were put into practice, there would be little change from before SOX was implemented. 
Executives gUilty of corporate wrongdoing would still get big severance packages, and 
the investors would be left with nothing. In fact, before the court's en banc decision, 
writers for the Washington Legal Foundation wrote: "By granting en banc review, the 
Ninth Circuit has temporarily prevented section 1103 from being rendered a virtual 
nullity." Michael R. Sklaire & Steven M. Goldsobel, Federal Court Ruling will Impact 
SEC's Ability to Freeze Assets Under Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Wash. Legal Found. (Jan. 28, 
2005), available at http://www.wcsr.com/downloads/pdfs/sox012805.pdf. 
183. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1051. 
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factors to be considered when comparing a severance payment to 
payments made by similar companies.184 The factors include: (1) 
the size of the company, (2) the type of market, (3) the employee's 
title, (4) how long the employee worked at the company, and (5) 
why the employee was terminated. I85 While these factors make it 
more likely that a severance package would be placed in escrow, 
their effectiveness is misleading because the factors require a com­
parison to companies not under investigation by the SEC.186 
In addition, and more importantly, one of the purposes of sec­
tion 1103 is to stop corporate executives from taking money that 
should go towards compensating investors.187 It is hardly appropri­
ate to compare executives under investigation for violating securi­
ties law to executives complying with the law because "[m]ost 
corporate executives and board members of this country work very 
hard, very diligently and in the highest professional manner to per­
form their function. This [ Act] is centered at those people that re­
ally do believe that greed is goOd."188 The intent of the legislature 
184. Id. at 1056. 
185. !d. By comparing the "extraordinary payments" of companies under investi­
gation by the SEC to companies not under investigation by the SEC, the dissenting 
judge misinterpreted the purpose of the statute. While the first two factors proposed by 
the judge, the size of the company and the type of market, give some guidance as to 
what a "comparable" company is, they do not provide a finite standard for the district 
courts and the SEC to use. See id. 
186. During 2002 and 2003, "the average severance package at an S&P 500 com­
pany amounted to $16.5 million." Anderson, supra note 174. These numbers would be 
measuring sticks for whether a severance package is an "extraordinary payment." Also, 
because of the recent corporate scandals, severance packages are not going "to deviate 
from the 'habits and customs of the marketplace,''' and therefore, according to the dis­
sent's test, most severance packages will not be placed into escrow by the SEC, even 
though they are "extraordinary." Rice, supra note 21, at 7. Based on these factors, to 
put a payment into escrow, the SEC would have "to conduct a full-blown evidentiary 
hearing." Sklaire & Goldsobel, supra note 182, at 2. It is possible that the hearing 
could simply become "a battle of experts." Id. This would make it a "question [of] ... 
whether the SEC would choose to derail its investigation of corporate fraud to devote 
the resources necessary to prevail in a section 1103 proceeding." Id. 
187. See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text. 
188. Conference Report on Corporate Responsibility Legislation, supra note 35 
(statement of Rep. Paul Kanjorski). Hollywood has stereotyped the corporate execu­
tive as greedy. This can be seen through Michael Douglas's character, Gordon Gecko, 
in the movie Wall Street: 
The point is, ladies and gentleman, that greed-for a lack of a better word-is 
good. Greed is right. Greed works. Greed clarifies, cuts through, and cap­
tures the essence of the evolutionary spirit. Greed, in all of its forms-greed 
for life, for money, for love, knowledge-has marked the upward surge of 
mankind. And greed-you mark my words-will not only save Teldar Paper, 
but that other malfunctioning corporation called the USA. 
WALL STREET (Warner Bros. 1987). Rep. Kanjorski was suggesting that SOX is essen­
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was to punish corporate wrongdoers, not to compare suspected 
wrongdoers to innocent CEOs when deciding if the suspected 
wrongdoers should have their payments put into escrow.189 
The dissent's test is therefore too narrow and impedes the ef­
fectiveness of section 1103. The dissent's test would allow many 
"extraordinary payments" to escape the authority of the SEC. 
Also, the standard the dissenting judge sets-comparing companies 
not under investigation by the SEC with those actually under inves­
tigation-evades the purpose of the Act. Consequently, the dis­
sent's interpretation of "extraordinary payments" is not the most 
effective test to use. 
D. 	 The Concurring Approach is the Most Effective Test for 
Evaluating "Extraordinary Payments" 
Declaring all severance packages to be "extraordinary pay­
ments," creates a bright-line rule, making it easy for the SEC to 
administer section 1103 in regard to severance packages. The dis­
cussion above suggests that both the majority opinion and the dis­
senting opinion provide ineffective tests, leading to more litigation 
than is necessary.190 While there are some weaknesses in the con­
curring opinion's test, it furthers the purpose of the Act, is easy for 
the SEC to administer, and is therefore the most effective means of 
deterring executives from taking payments after they have deceived 
investors. 
The concurring judge, like the majority, uses the definition of 
"extraordinary" to support his position;191 however, he does not 
follow up this definition with a vague "multi-faceted test."192 As 
Judge Reinhardt states, "the payment of benefits related to that 
severance, is, by definition, 'extraordinary': it is uncommon, unu­
sual, and, ultimately, not a part of the regular day-to-day business 
tially focused on the Gordon Geckos of the world, and not the majority of corporate 
executives who are hard-working individuals who do not believe greed is good. Confer­
ence Report on Corporate Responsibility Legislation, supra note 35 (statement of Rep. 
Paul Kanjorski). 
189. See 148 CONGo REC. H4685 (daily ed. July 16, 2002) (implying that once a 
company is under investigation by the SEC, a CEO's "pay and benefits" will be frozen 
automatically). Congress intended to focus on wrongdoers, not innocent CEOs, and 
therefore, the standard should focus on people not following the Act. See supra note 
188 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that Congress intended for the Act to be 
focused on greedy people). 
190. 	 See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
191. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031, 1049 (Reinhart, J., 
concurring). 
192. 	 [d. 
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of the company."193 Judge Reinhardt took the majority opinion 
and cut out all of the unnecessary factors and analysis to suggest 
that severance payments are never going to be "part of the day-to­
day operations of the enterprise. "194 The resulting bright-line rule 
will help to effectively implement the underlying purpose of the 
Act, will be easy for the SEC to administer, and will therefore help 
deter potential violators of securities regulations. 
1. 	 The Concurring Opinion Helps to Effectively Implement 
the Purpose of the Act 
The concurring opinion advocated its interpretation of section 
1103 with the purpose of SOX in mind.195 While the majority opin­
ion cited to the legislative history, that history was not used to cre­
ate an effective test,196 The Congressional Record clearly states 
that the purpose behind this section is to prevent executives from 
receiving large sums of money while the SEC is investigating their 
company.197 The majority interpreted this to mean that they should 
adopt a test with different factors, placing the burden on the SEC to 
justify freezing the payments. However, as the concurring opinion 
noted, "Congress did not intend that before the SEC may freeze a 
severance payment ... it must satisfy the 'extraordinariness' stan­
dard by presenting a substantial body of evidence to a court regard­
ing the purpose, circumstances, and size of that particular 
payment."198 By putting all severance payments into escrow, the 
SEC will be able to effectively stop executives from escaping with 
193. Id. The three "extraordinary expenses" cases used by both the majority and 
the dissent support the concurring opinion's position that "extraordinary" means some­
thing that is not part of the day-to-day business. See Atlanta-One, Inc. v. SEC, 100 F.3d 
105,107-08 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that "extraordinary" means something that does not 
happen in the day-to-day business of a company); Sousa v. Miguel, 32 F.3d 1370, 1376­
77 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Local Union No. 137, Int'I Bhd. of Team­
sters, 623 F.2d 1354, 1365 n.11 (9th Cir. 1980) (same). 
194. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1050. 
195. For a discussion of the purpose of section 1103, see supra notes 69-80 and 
accompanying text. 
196. 	 See supra notes 156-57. 
197. 148 CONGo REC. H4685 (daily ed. July 16, 2002); 148 CONGo REC. S6545 
(daily ed. July 10, 2002). 
198. Gemstar, 401 F.3d at 1051; see 145 CONGo REC. H4685 (daily ed. July 16, 
2002) ("Under this legislation, top executives will not be allowed to pilfer the assets of 
the company by giving themselves huge bonuses and other extraordinary payments if 
the company is subject to an SEC investigation.") (emphasis added); see also 148 CONGo 
REC. S6545 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (stating that adding the "extraordinary payment" 
provision would strengthen the bill, and fix some of the loopholes in the law). 
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huge severance packages, ensuring the return of funds to investors 
who have been harmed. 199 
2. 	 The Concurring Opinion's Test is Easy for the SEC to 
Administer 
Creating an easy-to-administer standard will allow the SEC to 
be more effective in carrying out the Act.200 Before SOX was 
passed, the SEC could not get a court order to escrow payments 
until they had formally filed charges against a company.201 The 
SEC had to satisfy a heavy burden in order to freeze assets.202 They 
had to "demonstrate that the underlying claim [was] meritorious 
and that a legitimate concern exist[ed] that absent a freeze, the as­
sets sought to be frozen [WOUld] be dissipated."203 Section 1103 was 
intended to take the burden off the SEC.204 
199. Gilchrist, supra note 72, at 893; see also Rice, supra note 21, at 5 (stating that 
the standard should be created with the prevention of harm to the investors in mind). 
Also, giving high severance packages suggests that the board of directors has no control 
over their shareholders' funds. Michael Brush, You're Fired. Here's Your $16 Million, 
MSN MONEY, Apr. 9, 2003, http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/p44954.asp. Brush 
also points out that many companies that have given large severance packages also have 
stock values that have dropped in the last few years. 1d. Brush states that the sever­
ance packages given to the Gemstar executives were "fairly typical." Jd. Allowing the 
SEC to put all severance packages into escrow will help offset worries by investors that 
the CEO and the CFO of the corporation are calling the shots, and the board of direc­
tors does not have any power. The concurring opinion's test allows the SEC to "aggres­
sively pursue" executives under investigation and return funds taken from executives to 
the investors. See Bilodeau, supra note 69. One of the purposes of the act was to allow 
the SEC to seek out executives who committed wrongful acts. Jd. 
200. See Conference Report on Corporate Responsibility Legislation, supra note 
35 (statement of Rep. Richard Shelby) (stating that "[t]o be effective, we must ensure 
that this legislation is properly implemented"). Bright-line rules often create a clear 
rule that does not result in arbitrary enforcement. See White House Vigil for the ERA 
Comm'n v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518, 1541 n.145 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that the court's 
ruling "[m]ost importantly ... establishes a clear, bright line rule that does not lend 
itself to arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement"); see also Osterneck v. Ernst & Whin­
ney, 489 U.S. 169, 176 n.3 (1989) (quoting Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 
U.S. 196,200 (1988)) (stating that "[c]ourts and litigants are best served by the bright­
line rule, which accords with traditional understanding"). While there are some critics 
of bright-line rules in securities law who feel bright-line rules "can be used by the clever 
and dishonest," this is not the case here. SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 
1337,1343 (S.D. Fla. 2004), affd, 408 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005). By creating this bright­
line rule, the court would be creating a narrowly tailored rule that would place into 
escrow a particular type of payment, providing compensation for wronged investors. 
Also, bright-line rules are not foreign to securities law. See infra note 206. 
201. Gilchrist, supra note 72, at 88l. 
202. Rice, supra note 21, at 2. 
203. Jd. 
204. The dissent's approach would put the burden back on the SEC. Jd. 
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Under SOX, the SEC only needs to show "that it 'appears to 
the commission' that an 'extraordinary payment' is likely to be 
made to an issuer."205 This language makes it clear that section 
1103 was passed to make it easier for the SEC to put payments into 
escrow. The concurring opinion's test does just this. It does not 
burden the SEC with a multi-factor test. It is a straightforward, 
bright-line rule that is simple for the SEC to apply.206 
The SEC admitted before the Gemstar case that it "was unsure 
what constituted extraordinary payments. "207 For this reason, the 
SEC was unable to give Gemstar guidance regarding whether the 
severance packages would be put into escrow.208 This is not an ef­
fective way to implement this provision.209 This uncertainty does 
not allow the SEC to pursue a payment freeze without wondering 
whether its investigation will be delayed by the need to litigate over 
205. /d. at 3 (quoting 15 u.s.c. § 78u-3(c)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 2004». 
206. Bright-line rules are not foreign to securities law. For example, the courts 
have consistently held that Congress intended to implement a bright-line rule when it 
passed section 16(b) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act. 15 U.S.c. § 78p(b) 
(2000). Section 16(b) "contains a blanket prohibition on insiders engaging in short­
swing trades-purchasing and selling (or vice versa) within a six-month window." Drei­
ling v. Kellett, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1219 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (citing 15 U.S.c. 
§ 78p(b». The courts have consistently held that, with respect to this provision, Con­
gress intended to pass a bright-line rule. See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Pe­
troleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 595 (1973); Colan v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 941 F.2d 933, 
944 (9th Cir. 1991), amended on other grounds, 951 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1991); Arrow 
Distrib. Corp. v. Baumgartner, 783 F.2d 1274, 1282 (5th Cir. 1986); Segen ex reI. KFx 
Inc. v. Westcliff Capital Mgmt., 299 F. Supp. 2d 262, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Dreiling, 281 
F. Supp. 2d at 1219. The courts have ruled that the intention of Congress is clear, and 
that section 16(b) should be implemented by a bright-line rule. Similarly, here Con­
gress clearly intended that section 1103 give back to investors who have been wronged, 
and this is exactly what a bright-line rule would do. 
207. Rice, supra note 21, at 4. This would not happen if a bright-line rule was 
created. Bright-line rules are known for their certainty, and: 
[I]f private actors can know in advance the incidence of official intervention, 
they will adjust their activities in advance to take account of them. From the 
point of view of the state, this increases the likelihood that private activity will 
follow a desired pattern. From the point of view of the citizenry, it removes 
the inhibiting effect on action that occurs when one's gains are subject to spo­
radic legal catastrophe. 
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 
1685, 1688-89 (1975-76). 
208. Rice, supra note 21, at 4. 
209. A bright-line rule would be an effective way to implement this provision. 
See supra note 200 (summarizing that bright-line rules often lead to non-arbitrary en­
forcement). This is further supported by the fact that "bright-line rules have grown 
increasingly important in corporate law over the course of this century." Matthew G. 
Dore, Statutes of Limitation and Corporate Fiduciary Claims: A Search for Middle 
Ground on the Rules/Standards Continuum, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 695, 773 (1997). 
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whether a payment is "extraordinary."210 The test proposed in the 
concurring opinion would give the SEC a clear and definitive rule 
as to when it can put an executive's severance package into 
escrow.2lt 
3. 	 The Concurring Opinion's Test Will Help Deter 
Violations of Securities Law 
The test set out in the concurring opinion will also help deter 
potential violations of SOx. Severance packages paid to executives 
in America are so high that in some instances it may be more profit­
able for executives to get fired than to keep their jobS.212 This does 
not encourage executives to follow the corporate governance rules 
within SOX. If the worst-case scenario for these executives is a vio­
lation of securities law that results in a severance package worth 
more than they would have received if they had stayed with the 
company, then there is less incentive to comply with securities law. 
Section 1103 aids the SEC in enforcing other provisions within 
SOX. Therefore, it is important to apply an easily enforceable test 
to section 1103 to increase overall deterrence of securities law viola­
tions.213 For example, the executive bar provision of SOX allows 
the SEC to bar an officer from serving on a board of directors if the 
.SEC finds that he or she is unfit.214 If it is more profitable for a 
CEO to be fired than to keep his job, the executive bar provision 
becomes meaningless. When an executive receives a huge sever­
ance package after violating securities law, it may not be important 
to that executive that she has been barred from serving on a board 
of directors, because after the large severance package, she may not 
have to work at all in order to maintain her existing lifestyle. 
The standard used to enforce section 1103 could also have an 
210. Also, this does not help companies determine which payments they give to 
their officers will be put into escrow. 
211. See supra note 200 (discussing the clarity of bright-line rules); see also Kath­
leen M. Sullivan, Forward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 
62 (1992) ("[R]ules afford certainty and predictability to private actors, enabling them 
to order their affairs productively. Standards produce uncertainty, thereby chilling so­
cially productive behavior."). A bright-line rule would also reduce any arbitrariness or 
bias and require consistent action. See id. (stating the arguments for rules). 
212. Russ Banham, Pay in the Balance-Severance Packages, THE CHIEF EXECU­
TIVE (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m4070/is_2001_ 
Augusta/ai_78805390. 
213. See Conference Report on Corporate Responsibility Legislation, supra note 
35 (statement of Rep. Richard Shelby) ("[P]assing [SOX] is not enough .... To be 
effective, we must ensure that this legislation is properly implemented."). 
214. Androphy & Graham, supra note 18, at 67. 
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effect on the code-of-ethics provision of SOX. The code-of-ethics 
provision encourages corporations to adopt ethics rules that would 
address conflict of interest scenarios and encourage full disclosure 
of SEC filings. 215 The goal of the code-of-ethics section is to pro­
mote "honest and ethical" conduct.216 However, because compa­
nies can tailor their codes in any way they choose, this provision has 
come under criticism for being ineffective.217 The fear of losing a 
hefty severance package may encourage CEOs and CFOs to live up 
to the desired standard of "honest and ethical" conduct, which 
would compensate for the lack of deterrence within the code-of­
ethics provision itself. 
Also, having a strict punishment provision in SOX may help 
offset other weaknesses within the Act, including those found in the 
signatory requirements for CEOs and CFOs. The signatory re­
quirements mandate that CEOs and CFOs certify corporate finan­
cial information.218 While this was supposed to give the Act 
sharper "teeth,"219 critics state that this provision will not stop exec­
utives from lying on SEC filings.22o However, strict application of 
section 1103 will serve as a strong incentive for executive honesty. 
While it is true that this bright-line approach may make finding 
CEOs to run corporations more difficult, this would only apply to 
executives who might be guilty of wrongdoing. Since the passage of 
SOX, it has become increasingly difficult for corporations to find 
qualified candidates to fill executive positions.221 CEO candidates 
are hesitant to risk liability, and the risk of losing a severance pack­
age makes candidates even less willing to apply for these jobs.222 
However, this only will affect executives not fit to serve as officers; 
therefore, if the executive is careful and complies with securities 
law, then she has little to worry about.223 Although the bright-line 
test can be harsh, and may result in the freezing of legitimate sever­
ance payments, it is also the most effective test. The concurring 
215. HAZEN 5th ed., supra note 56. 
216. Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30. 
217. Note, The Good, the Bad, and their Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron, 
Sarbanes-Oxley, and the Problems with Legislating Good Behavior, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
2123, 2134-36 (2003). 
218. Testimony Concerning Implementation, supra note 30. 
219. Gorman & Stewart, supra note 15, at 152. 
220. Aronson, supra note 30, at 131-32. 
221. Bilodeau, supra note 69. 
222. Berg, supra note 58, at 1901. 
223. See Conference Report on Corporate Responsibility Legislation, supra note 
35 (statement of Rep. Paul Kanjorski) (stating the Act's purpose "is centered around 
people that believe that greed is good"). 
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opinion's test is a straightforward, easy to administer test that helps 
the SEC reach its goal and increases investor confidence by al­
lowing the SEC to effectively return funds to investors when there 
has been corporate misgovernance. 
In any event, "innocent" severance packages put into escrow 
will be returned if there was no wrongdoing. Furthermore, the SEC 
has the discretion to not place seemingly "innocent" or "ordinary" 
payments in escrow.224 As the concurring opinion stated, the SEC 
"will undoubtedly consider whether, on the basis of the limited 
facts available to it, a particular freeze order is necessary or desira­
ble to protect the public interest."225 Although it is true that some 
"innocent" payments may be put into escrow, these payments will 
be returned after the escrow period. 
The concurring opinion's bright-line rule will make wrongdo­
ing executives fear the consequences of violating securities law. 
Having a simple test might help to deter corporate officers from 
breaking the law, and could set higher deterrence standards for the 
rest of the Act. Creating a strong bright-line rule to implement sec­
tion 1103 will create a more powerful and effective SEC. Conse­
quently, this will help to effectively implement other provisions of 
the Act. 
CONCLUSION 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act arose out of the corporate scandals of 
the 1990s with the goal of restoring investor confidence in the mar­
kets.226 The investors of the 1990s differed from the investors of 
the past.227 These newer investors were middle class Americans 
saving for their children's college educations and their own retire­
ment.228 The purpose of SOX was to encourage these investors to 
start investing in stocks again after many of them had lost money in 
the wake of corporate scandals.229 In order to get these investors 
back into the market, a much stronger SEC needed to be created, 
an SEC with the power to punish corporate wrongdoers. 
224. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'!, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031, 1050 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(Reinhardt, J., concurring), cerro denied, 126 S. Ct. 416 (2005). 
225. Jd. 
226. Glassman, supra note 33. 
227. Wilkins, supra note 2, at 339 (citing an increase in households with 
investments). 
228. See id. (stating that the stock markets are now an important part of many 
Americans' financial planning). 
229. See Glassman, supra note 33; Wilkins, supra note 2, at 339-40 (implying that 
the purpose behind SOX was to create investor confidence in the market). 
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This is why the concurring opinion's test in Gemstar, a bright­
line rule where all severance packages are considered "extraordi­
nary payments," is the test that should be adopted. This test helps 
to give section 1103 and the SEC a provision that can easily and 
effectively compensate wronged investors. 
Also, by implementing this bright-line rule, the SEC can easily 
administer section 1103. The SEC will no longer have to guess 
whether a certain severance package fits into the category of "ex­
traordinary payment," cutting down on litigation time and costS.230 
This will allow the SEC to focus more time on the investigation 
rather than on securing the funds to compensate investors if wrong­
doing is found. 231 
Furthermore, this rule will encourage potential wrongdoers to 
follow the requirements of SOX. The severance packages of many 
CEOs and CFOs are high. In some cases it is more profitable for 
these executives to leave the company than to continue working.232 
However, if the SEC can put all severance packages into escrow, 
then following corporate rules might become more appealing to 
these executives. Consequently, this will help deter executives from 
violating securities law in the first instance, and could possibly 
strengthen the SEC and other provisions within SOX. 
Finally, this straightforward, bright-line test is more effective 
for furthering the intent of the legislature and the purpose of SOX. 
This test will allow the SEC to crack down on corporate wrongdo­
ers, avoid future corporate scandals, and help investors regain and 
maintain confidence in the financial markets. 
Christine J. Unger* 
230. Rice, supra note 21, at 4. This could also work the same way for 
corporations. 
231. See Sklaire & Goldsobel, supra note 182. 
232. See Anderson, supra note 174 (citing severance packages that range from 
$9.4 million to $82 million); Banham, supra note 212 (stating that it might be more 
profitable for some executives to get fired rather than keep their jobs). 
* Thank you to the editors of the Western New England Law Review and to my 
family for all of their support. 
